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Summary 
 
On May 7, 2010, it was a year since the European Union formally 
launched its Eastern Partnership program. In this year, the EaP 
has been almost completely shaped institutionally, with the 
vademecum on financing determined and first projects beginning 
to be implemented. Belarus, however, is far from full-scale 
participation in the EaP, as it has neither made much progress in 
political dialog nor met the EU standards considering 
democratization within the country.  
 
 
The Eastern Partnership was technically adopted by the European Council in March 2009. 
At the same time Belarus was invited to join in as a full-fledged partner, rather than in a 
5+1 format, as it had been planned before. The European leaders took a positive decision 
on Belarus, thus making overtures to the Belarusian regime in response to slight 
liberalization attempts within the country in 2009. There was also geopolitical reasoning 
in Belarus being granted membership in the EaP, since official Minsk did not recognize 
the sovereignty of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and continued drifting away from Moscow 
politically. Besides, the whole idea of a partnership program with the EU’s eastern 
neighbors would have lost ground if such a geographically and geopolitically important 
state as Belarus had been excluded.  
 
 
Long-term and Short-term Goals 
 
The main goal of the Eastern Partnership initiative was to bring the six post-Soviet 
countries within the orbit of the European Union, which is in line with the EU strategic 
aim of creating a zone of good neighborhood and prosperity along its borders. The EaP 
foresees agreements on association, creating a free-trade zone and gradually 
establishing common market with the six states in the next few years, modeled on the 
one the EU has with such countries as Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein. The EU 
proposes to gradually reduce the visa prices and simplify the visa application procedures, 
with a view to introducing visa-free travel with the partner countries in the long term.  
 
In the short run, the Eastern Partnership initiative aims at facilitating the economic 
reform and transformation of political systems in the partner countries; helping them to 
achieve a greater energy efficiency, to establish good government and co-operation 
between themselves.  
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Formalization of the Initiative 
 
On May 7, 2009 Prague saw an inaugural summit, which officially launched the Eastern 
Partnership initiative. From the very beginning it included four multilateral platforms for 
co-operation, namely democracy, good government and stability; economic integration 
and convergence towards the EU policies; energy security and contacts between people. 
Within the platforms, the following areas of work were agreed on: 
 
Multilateral Platforms Areas of Work in 2010-2011 
Democracy, good government and 
stability 
 Improved functioning of the Judiciary;  
 Public administration reform and fight against 
corruption;  
 Launching and fulfilling the Integrated Border 
Management flagship initiative;  
 Launching and fulfilling a flagship initiative on 
prevention of, preparedness for and response 
to natural and man-made disasters. 
Economic integration and 
convergence towards the EU 
policies 
 Trade and trade related regulatory 
approximation;  
 Convergence towards the EU environmental 
legislation and combating climate change;  
 Preparation for launching the Small and 
Medium-size Enterprise (SME) Facility 
flagship project;  
 Enhanced co-operation in the field of taxation 
and public finance;  
 Increasing employment levels;  
 Strengthened co-operation in questions of  
monetary, exchange rate and financial 
stability;  
 Regional economic co-operation. 
Energy security   
 Development and implementation of mutual 
energy support and security mechanisms; 
 Support for infrastructure development, 
interconnection and diversification of supply; 
 Promotion of increased energy efficiency and 
use of renewable resources; 
 approximation of energy policies; 
 Development of a flagship initiative on 
Regional Energy Markets and Energy 
Efficiency. 
 
Contacts between people  Education and training; 
 International higher education co-operation 
programs (Tempus and Erasmus Mundus); 
 E-twinning program; 
 Education and research mobility; 
 A project in networking European Studies 
centers; 
 The Jean Monnet program; 
 Co-operation in youth policies;  
 Co-operation in culture; 
 Development of information society; 
  Greater integration of the Eastern partners 
into the 7th Framework Program for Research 
and Technological Development (FP7) 
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It was also determined that the EaP should have a two-tier structure, consisting of 
bilateral and multilateral dimensions. Institutionally the Eastern Partnership includes 
biannual summits, annual meetings of Foreign Ministers, the Euronest inter-
parliamentary assembly and the Civil Society Forum. The latter was introduced for the 
purpose of representing the partner countries’ NGOs. The EaP institutional model also 
presupposed high level meetings for solving current issues. For the past year, this 
structure has been gradually taking shape and enhancing its functioning mechanisms. For 
example, there were meetings on the minister level with the EaP functioning and project 
funding on the agenda. November 2009 saw the Civil Society Forum, and the Euronest 
draft regulations were drawn up.  
 
In the Summer and Fall of 2009, project proposals to be funded within the EaP 
framework were prepared, with Belarus being the first to submit its projects, just as the 
case was within the Euronest framework. In December 2009, the European Commission 
presented the Vademecum on Financing in the Frame of the Eastern Partnership. The € 
600 million of EaP financing will cover a four year period with a growing profile, i.e. € 85 
million in 2010; € 110 million in 2011; € 175 million in 2012; and € 230 million in 2013. 
These resources will be used for three main purposes: support for partner country 
reforms through the implementation of Comprehensive Institution Building programmes 
(CIB) (approximately € 175 million); Pilot regional development programmes 
(approximately € 75 million) and Implementation of the Eastern Partnership Multilateral 
dimension (approximately € 350 million). 
 
For the past year the EU and the partner countries have developed and started 
implementing so-called flagship initiatives, aimed at advancing the multilateral track of 
the Eastern Partnership. At present there are five flagship initiatives:  
Flagship Initiative Main Areas of Work 
Integrated Border Management  Exchange of best practices; 
 Training and capacity building; 
 Pilot projects on Pan-European 
Corridors and TRACECA 
Prevention of, Preparedness for and 
Response to Natural and Man-made 
Disasters 
 Review of existing civil 
protection/disaster management 
capacities;  
 Review of the current legislative 
frameworks; 
 Preparation of regional Risk Atlas; 
 Capacity building for prevention, 
preparedness and response 
activities; 
 Increased co-operation with the EU 
Civil protection mechanism and 
conclusion of administrative 
arrangements with interested 
partner countries.  
Environmental Governance  Development of a Shared 
Environmental Information System 
(SEIS); 
 Strengthening of capacities to 
ensure stakeholder involvement, 
environmental assessments and 
reporting, on the basis of EU 
experience and legislation, and in 
line with relevant Environment 
Agreements, such as the Aarhus 
and Espoo Conventions.  
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SME Facility  Training and exchange of best 
practices; 
 Direct Technical Assistance (TA) to 
SMEs; 
 Establishment, together with EBRD 
and EIB, of a joint SME facility open 
to participation of other financial 
institutions. 
Regional Energy Markets and Energy 
Efficiency 
 TA for studies/expertises in matters 
of regulatory and policy framework; 
 Feasibility studies and other 
activities to improve access to 
available financing sources for 
investment in the energy sector; 
 Support the establishment and 
implementation of ‘sustainable energy 
action plans’; 
 Promote the participation of the EaP 
countries in the Intelligent Energy 
Europe Programme.  
 
Failed Expectations 
 
In entering the Eastern Partnership program, the official Minsk was mainly interested in 
getting financial support and investment, as well as implementing joint infrastructural 
projects. The EaP political dimension was viewed as an irritating makeweight to the 
dialog with Brussels, which just could not be avoided. The Belarusian regime viewed its 
turnaround in Belarus – EU relations as an exchange of geopolitical loyalty for financial 
support exclusively, which had no room for the EU intervening in the Belarusian internal 
affairs. Shocked by Russia’s actions, the West was prepared to accept these terms in the 
late 2008 and early 2009. However, things have changed since then. 
  
The world economic crisis, ‘reloaded’ relations with Russia and cooling down after the 
Russia – Georgia war have brought back more caution in European politicians’ attitude 
towards the Belarusian regime. The EU’s concessions have given way to attempts to 
reintroduce conditionality concerning the Lukashenka government. This was particularly 
reflected in the issue of Euronest membership.  
 
According to the Prague Declaration, being an inter-parliamentary assembly, the 
Euronest should include representatives of the partner countries’ legislative institutions. 
However, this requirement contradicts the EU’s refusal to recognize Belarusian 
parliament as a legitimate representative body. For this reason, the European Parliament 
suggested that it is the representatives of the Belarusian opposition and civil society that 
should be invited to the Euronest, which official Minsk unconditionally rejects. There are 
also certain reservations concerning the representation of the civil society, which is 
already represented in a separate institution, namely the Civil Society Forum.  
 
Thus, the initial lack of moral ground and consistency in the EU policy towards Belarus 
has resulted in a diplomatic dead end. In order to find a way out, the EU should clearly 
outline its objectives in pursuing dialog with Belarus. If the strategic goal is long-term 
engagement, it is difficult to make sense of this inconsistency. If the purpose is regime 
change or its political isolation, Brussels’ actions are not sufficient or efficient enough. 
The European Union might consider freezing the Belarusian seats in the Euronest until 
the next parliamentary election as a possible way out of the dead end. Such a solution 
may satisfy both the parties, releasing tension in order to continue co-operation in those 
areas where it is possible.  
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Expectations and Reality 
 
Apart from the institutional issues, there are also certain difficulties concerning financing 
Belarusian projects in the frame of the Eastern Partnership. It has already been 
mentioned that Belarus was the first to finish up its draft projects within the EaP. All the 
projects submitted by Belarus have not yet been made public, but there is reliable 
information about some of them, including  
- A project to build a Berlin – Moscow autobahn via Belarus;  
- An extension of the Odessa – Brody pipeline to Gdansk with sidelines to Belarusian oil 
refineries;  
- Electricity transit project from Ukraine to Lithuania, which presupposes construction of 
extra electric power lines; 
- Co-operation in renewable energy sources, such as biogas, wind energy and water 
power plants;  
- Construction of Klaipeda – Vilnius – Minsk – Kiev highway;  
- Viking railway transportation project from Odessa to Klaipeda;  
- Modernizing the customs infrastructure and professional development for customs 
officers; 
- Celebration of the 600th anniversary of the battle of Grunwald, etc.   
 
Minsk has not yet received an answer from the European Commission about financing the 
projects within the EaP framework, which has caused the Belarusian leader’s 
disappointment with the Belarus – EU co-operation.  
 
Absence of the EU – Belarus agreement on partnership and co-operation closes the door 
to the EaP bilateral dimension for Belarus, limiting access to funding from the EIB, EBRD 
and other European financial institutions. The EaP budget to finance multilateral projects 
is not enough to meet official Minsk’s expectations.  
 
Furthermore, European officials have stressed more than once that the Eastern 
Partnership is not an infrastructural project or assistance program, thus suggesting that 
the EU is not going to finance its neighboring countries, particularly if they are unwilling 
to extend their political relations with the EU. The fact that financing in the EaP frame is 
to be distributed between the six partner countries depending on the reform success is 
also an unpleasant development for Belarus.  It means that Minsk will have to search 
funding outside the Eastern Partnership, which definitely makes it look less attractive in 
the eyes of the Belarusian leadership. 
 
From the perspective of the Belarusian authorities, the country now finds itself in a 
particularly complicated geopolitical situation. On the one hand, its relations with Russia 
are in all probability hopelessly spoilt, as there will be no return to the previous 
subsidies. On the other hand, Belarus has failed to drive a hard bargain in trading its 
geopolitical loyalty to the West, which does not hasten to subsidize the Belarusian regime 
without its undergoing a profound reform. Under such circumstances, it will probably 
have to resort to the meridian dimension, making an attempt to build up a strategic 
alliance with Ukraine and Lithuania by binding them with transit projects with a view to 
stabilizing its position for some time.  
 
 
Who Benefited? 
 
Since the EU pursued long-term goals in launching the Eastern Partnership initiative, it 
would be wrong to assess it as unsuccessful after its first year only. On the contrary, the 
EaP was prepared and launched in the shortest possible time, which is not characteristic 
of the EU. The initiative was also quickly formalized institutionally. It would have been 
unrealistic to expect more. For this reason, Minsk’s disappointment could probably be 
attributed to lack of understanding as to how the EU works and excessively high initial 
expectations.  
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It is necessary to differentiate between the assessment of the EaP and Belarus’s 
engagement in it on the one hand and the EU – Belarus dialog on the other. Despite 
being closely interconnected, these two things are still different. It may be too early to 
assess the feasibility of Belarus’s engagement in the EaP for the EU long-term goals, but 
it can already be argued that the political dialog has come to a standstill. The EU has not 
been able to achieve true liberalization and democratization of the political regime in 
Belarus, nor have the parties made any progress towards reviewing and ratifying the 
Agreement on Partnership and Co-operation. There is still no legal framework for their 
relations and the visa ban so far has not been withdrawn but only temporarily frozen.  
 
The general public in Belarus has not yet felt a beneficial influence of the EaP, the price 
of Schengen visas still being € 60 and the application procedure remaining quite 
complicated. Jobs in the EU are out of the question, too.  
 
Official Minsk did not benefit greatly from its participation in the Eastern Partnership, 
either. True, it put an end to the country’s political isolation and ridded it of its label as 
‘the last dictatorship in Europe’. However, it did not provide much longed-for subsidies, 
as IMF loans to Belarus are linked to successful use of the dialog rather than the EaP 
membership.  
 
Judging by the outcome of the first year, Belarusian civil society seems the only one to 
have benefited from the EaP. It now has its representation in the Civil Society Forum, 
having achieved an attractive format of co-operation in the frame of the Eastern 
Partnership. Siarhiej Mackievic, head of the NGO Assembly working group was elected 
the Forum speaker and at the April meeting the Forum members ensured their 
participation in other projects within the EaP framework. Belarusian NGOs do not only 
make their voice heard on the EU level owing to the Civil Society Forum, but they have 
also started to act much more actively in Belarus, consolidating their work on 
recommendations on the Belarusian projects in the frame of the Eastern Partnership.  
Whereas the Belarus – EU dialog and the launch of the EaP have resulted in the further 
marginalization of the political opposition, which has lost its monopoly on contacts with 
the West, NGOs have obtained a new international forum, their activities now gaining 
momentum.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
1. Compared to the previous EU projects and policies, the Eastern Partnership is a 
rapidly developing initiative. The Belarusian leadership’s complaints about the EaP 
losing impetus arise from their lack of experience of co-operation with the EU and an 
urgent need for investment.  
2. The Eastern Partnership is a long-term initiative to bring the partner countries closer 
to the EU. It does not aim at dramatic political and economic change in the partner 
countries. Nor is it an infrastructural project to provide financial and technical 
assistance, as official Minsk would want it to be. However, the EaP could be an 
excellent tool to gradually introduce European standards and attract investment from 
sources outside the EaP budget.  
3. The only actor to have benefited from its participation in the EaP seems to be 
Belarusian civil society. Neither the Belarusian government nor the EU has so far 
achieved their objectives in the frame of the Eastern Partnership.  
4. In order to strengthen the EaP impact as a policy of engagement the EU should 
refrain from institutional restrictions concerning Belarus in the issue of representation 
in the Euronest. It would be advisable instead to concentrate on restoring political 
conditionality towards official Minsk, linked to further economic integration with the 
EU and extra funding for Belarus from European and international financial 
institutions.  
